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Litigation
Ethics
Counseling
thec lient:
Refreshing
Recollection
orProiinpting
Perjury?
by Monroe H. Freedman

Editor's Note: With this article by
Dean Freedman, we begin what we
hope will be a regularcolumn in Litigation examining the ethical problems confronted by litigators in the
adversaryprocess. Public confidence
in the integrity of the legalprofession
was severely shaken by the role played
by lawyers in the Watergate scandal.
and the shock waves from that scandal still reverberate throughout the
profession. We believe that the lost
con/idence can be restored only if
lawyers engage in open dialogues
among themselves and with the
public on ethical question, and we
hope this column will contribute to
that dialogue.
Experienced litigating attorneys are
well aware of the vital importance of
eliciting all relevant facts from the
client and helping the client-who,
typically, is not skilled at articulation
-to marshall and to express his or
her case as persuasively as possible.
The poorly educated day laborer
who has suffered an injury, and who
can only say, "It hurts bad," must be
helped to articulate what the pain is
like, when it is present, and how it interferes with work, sleep, family life,
and recreation. Also, the statement,
"I hurt myself while I was working,"
will not be enough. The relevant
details must be elicited through
skilled questioning, and the witness
must then be sufficiently rehearsed to
assure that no important evidence
will be overlooked in testimony at
trial, where leading questions will not
be permitted.
Numerous books and articles have
been written and innumerable lecThe author is Dean and Professor of Law
at Hofstra Law School and is Chairman of
the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of
Columbia Bar. This installment of litigation
Ethics has been adapted by Dean Freedman
from his book Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (Bobbs-Merrill1975).
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tures have been given about effective
interviewing and preparation techniques. What has not been adequately considered, however, is the extent
to which proper preparation crosses
the line of ethical conduct and becomes a violation of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A), which, among other things,
forbids a lawyer to participate in the
creation of false evidence. In short,
when is a lawyer refreshing recollection, and when is he or she prompting
perjury?
The "best legal thought" regarding
proper interview and preparation
techniques has been set forth in Selected Writings on the Law of Evidence and Trial (W. Fryer ed. 1957),
which was compiled under the sponsorship of the Association of American Law Schools by a committee of
the nation's leading authorities on the
law of evidence. In one of the selected
articles, Harry S. Bodin notes that it is
generally advisable to let the client
tell his or her own story while the
lawyer just listens. If the attorney insists upon getting only answers to
specific questions, important points
may be screened out because a lawyer cannot possibly anticipate all the
facts in every case. Having gotten the
client's story in narrative fashion, the
lawyer must then seek additional
facts that may have been omitted.
That is done by asking questions and
by explaining to the client how important the additional information
may be to the case. "If the client can
be made to understand your
thoughts," Mr. Bodin writes, "he
may tell you facts which otherwise
would have been inadvertently overlooked or consciously and erroneously discarded by him as immaterial."
At the same time it is recognized
that the client's story will be affected
by a "subconscious suppression, psychologically induced by the wish to
put one's best foot forward or by nature's trick of inducing forgetfulness

of what one does not like to remember." That is, people will, in perfectly
good faith, relate past events in a way
that they believe (rightly or wrongly)
to be consistent with their own interests. Necessarily, therefore, in
pressing the client for additional information, and in explaining the
relevance and importance of that information, the lawyer will be affecting the ultimate testimony. As emphasized by Professor Edward W.
Cleary in another of the selected articles, although it is improper to
prompt or suggest an answer to one's
witness during the actual testimony,
the interview "affords full play to suggestion.., and evokes in advance of
trial a complete verbalization, the
importance of which cannot be overlooked."

Rehearsals
The process of preparing or
coaching the witness, of course, goes
far beyond the initial eliciting of
facts. In the course of polishing the
client's testimony, eminent author
Lloyd Paul Stryker recommends as
many as fifty full rehearsals of direct
and cross-examination. During those
rehearsals, the testimony is developed
in a variety of ways. The witness is
vigorously cross-examined, and then
the attorney points out where the witness has been "tripped" and how the
testimony can be restructured to
avoid that result. The attorney may
also take the role of witness and be
cross-examined by an associate. The
attorney's "failures" in simulated
testimony are then discussed, and the
attorney then may conduct a mock
cross-examination of the associate. In
that way, "new ideas are developed
while all the time the client is looking
on and listening. He probably is saying, 'Let me try again.' And you will
then go through the. whole process
once more." By that time, as one
might expect, the client "does far
better." In fact, after many weeks of
preparation, "perhaps on the very eve
of trial," the client may come up with
a new fact that "may perhaps make a
difference between victory and
defeat."
Nowhere in those three selections
relating to preparation of witnesses is
there any analysis of the ethical implications of the model practices that

are set forth. Mr. Stryker does say
that, in repeatedly going over the
"hard spots" and the "awkward
places" and in showing the client how
to "surmount his difficulties," the
witness is "still staying well within the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth." Saying that, however,
does not make it so. If people do respond to suggestion, and if the lawyer
helps the client to "fill in the gaps"
and to avoid being "tripped," by developing "new ideas" in the course of
repeated rehearsals, it is reasonably
clear that the testimony that ultimately is presented in court will have
been significantly affected by the
lawyer's prompting and by the
client's self-interest. Whether the end
product is "well within the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the
truth" is therefore subject to considerable doubt.
In fact, one finds in the three selections an astonishing disregard of the
ethical implications of the preparation of testimony. It is difficult to
believe that one with Stryker's experience and sophistication is unaware of the impact of suggestion,
which is recognized in the article by
Cleary. Similarly, Cleary concerns
himself only with the problem of how
rules of evidence-but not the rules of
legal ethics-might be reformed to
take into account the psychological
realities that he discusses. Bodin also
recognizes the "psychologically induced" inclination to remember or
forget in a way consistent with one's
own interests. However, he ignores
the implications of that fact when he
discusses how important it is for the
lawyer to make the client aware of the
importance and significance of information that may have been left out
of the client's original narrative.
In addition, the Bodin article (unlike Cleary's) reflects the general ignorance within the legal profession of
psychological learning regarding
memory. For example, Bodin says,
"Experienced trial lawyers have
learned that even an honest and rational client, who will not invent
'facts,' may nevertheless suppress
facts." Experiments by psychologists,
however, indicate that those experienced trial lawyers (whoever they may
be) are wrong: invention is no less
common than suppression. Bodin

36

also states, "Of first importance in
any action are the facts-the exact
facts and all the facts." He then explains how the lawyer mutt seek to
elicit "all the important facts" by
probing the client's memory with
"detailed questioning." What Bodin
does not seem to realize is that the
effort to obtain "all the facts" is virtually certain to result in obtaining
something very different from "the
exact facts."
One of the most common misconceptions about memory is that it is a
process of recollection or reproduction of impressions, closely analogous
to the functioning of a phonograph
record or tape recorder. In that respect, legal thinking is centuries out
of date, proceeding as if highly relevant experiments in behavioral psychology had never taken place. In
fact, perceiving is itself active and
constructive, and memory is much
more a process of reconstruction than
one of recollection or recall. Moreover, the process is a highly creative
one, affecting what is "remembered"
as much as what is "forgotten."

Subjective Accuracy
Thus, contrary to Bodin's assertion, an honest and rational client will
invent facts as readily as suppress
them. Indeed, even before the process
of remembering begins, what goes
into the supposed "mental storehouse" is signficantly influenced by
the personality and previous experiences of the observer. As noted by
F.C. Bartlett, who is probably the
leading experimental psychologist
concerned with memory, "temperament, interests, and attitudes often
direct the course and determine the
content of perceiving." Nor is any
dishonesty involved in that process.
"[One] may do this without being in
the least aware that he is either supplementing or falsifying the data of
perception. Yet, in almost all cases,
he is certainly doing the first, and in
many cases he is demonstrably doing
the second." According to another
expert, the "vast majority" of testimonial errors are those of the "average, normal honest man," errors
"unknown to the witness and wholly
unintentional." Such testimony has
been described as "subjectively ac(Please turn to page 45)

quitted.
One wonders how many persons
have escaped punishment for murder
solely because the death penalty was
the jury's only alternative to acquittal. And one wonders why this compelling, if inverted, argument was not
more forcefully advanced by the organized opponents to capital punishment in their long, untiring, and
fruitful campaign to re-orient the
nation's views on criminal punishment-a re-orientation that is reflected in the 1972 Furman opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United
States, equivocally abolishing capital
punishment in the nation.

Proving
Punlitive
I)aniagcs
(Continued from page 30)
Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (1974).
Finally, the effective trial advocate
should consider the question of terminology in referring to the subject
of punitive damages. The expressions
"punitive" and "exemplary" have
been used to describe the award. The
following language of Lord Hailsham
of St. Marylebone L.C. in the case of
Broome v. Cassell & Co. (H.L. (E.)),
(1972) A. C. 1027, 1073, provides
some guidance:
As between 'punitive' or 'exemplary,' one should, I would suppose, choose one to the exclusion
of the other, since it is never wise
to use two quite interchangeable
terms to denote the same thing.
Speaking for myself, I prefer
'exemplary,' not because 'punitive' is necessarily inaccurate,
but 'exemplary' better expresses
the policy of the law as expressed
in the cases. It is intended to
teach the defendant and others
that 'tort does not pay' by demonstrating what consequences
the law inflicts rather than simply to make the defendant suffer
an extra penalty for what he has
done, although that does, of
course, precisely describe its ef-

fect.
Whatever terminology is adopted,
however, you will not maximize the
recovery for your client if, in the appropriate business tort setting, you do
not gear your trial preparation for
seeking "punitive" or "exemplary"
damages against the defendant.

AttorneyClient
Privilc c
(Continued from page 20)
client's possession-both favorable
and unfavorable. Only if he is fully
informed can he devise the most effective strategy and tactics to promote the client's goals.
Understandably, both attorney
and client will attempt to cloak the
unfavorable data with the attorneyclient privilege. Others, recognizing
that this kind of data will be in the
attorney's possession, will attempt to
have it disclosed on the record. Some
of these contests may well end up in
the courts. The result will be a further
evolution of the attorney-client privilege.
It is too early to predict the direction of that evolution. There are
forceful arguments in both directions. The very fact that there are persuasive reasons to deny the privilege,
indicates that we may well soon see
attorneys forced to make full disclosure of all data in their possession
when the issue at stake is in the legislative arena.

Kalmbach. Dean had no incentive
whatsoever to lie about that particular incident. In fact, it was extremely important to him to state the facts
with as much exactness as possible.
He testified that he had met Kalmbach in the coffee shop of the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C.,
and that they had gone directly
upstairs to Kalmbach's room in the
same hotel. Dean was pressed several
times on that point, in a way that implied that his questioners had reason
to believe that he was lying as to
whether the meeting had taken place
at all. Each time, Dean confidently
reaffirmed his clear recollection
about the incident. Finally, it was
revealed that the register of the Mayflower Hotel indicated that Kalmbach had not been staying at the hotel
at the time in question. Dean nevertheless remained certain of the occurrence, putting forth the unlikely
theory that Kalmbach had been using
an alias. The difficulty was cleared
up when someone realized that there
is a Mayflower Doughnut Coffee
Shop in the Statler Hilton Hotel in
Washington-and Kalmbach was
found to have been registered there,
under his own name, on the day in
question. Thus, Dean's basic story
was confirmed. Without realizing it,
however, Dean had inaccurately resolved the ambiguity created by the
coincidence of the two names by confidently "remembering" the wrong
hotel, and by inventing the use of an
alias by Kalmbach, despite the fact
that he had had every incentive to
report those details correctly and had
come close to being seriously discredited because of his unconscious
error.
Leading Questions

Litigation
Ethics
(Continuedfrompage 36)
curate but objectively false."
An interesting illustration of the
tendency to eliminate situational ambiguities in remembering was provided in the Senate Watergate hearings. John Dean was testifying
regarding a meeting with Herbert
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Questioning is, of course, an essential part of interviewing and preparing a witness for trial. It is particularly noteworthy, therefore, that
questions, even "straightforward
questions of fact," may play a very
strong part in inducing "importation of detail" into the process of remembering, and that leading questions, when purposefully used to induce error, succeed in doing so to a
startling degree. A recent study by
Elizabeth Loftus showed that witnesses' estimates of the speed of an

automobile involved in an accident
will vary with the verb used by the
questioner in describing the impact:
"smashed" (40.8 mph), "collided"
(39.3 mph), "bumped" (38.1 mph),
"hit" (34.0 mph), and "contacted"
(31.8 mph). In addition, twice as
many witnesses reported seeing nonexistent broken glass on the ground
when the questioner used the word
"smashed" instead of "hit." Dr.
Loftus concluded that "memory itself
undergoes a change" as a result of the
type of question asked.
Moreover, memory in general, and
responses to questions in particular,
will be affected by "preferential psychological reactions." As Bartlett
notes, there is a natural and honest
tendency to remember-reconstruct in
ways that are "strongly determined
by an active subjective bias of the
nature of interest."
Creative Process
To sum up, the process of remembering is not one dependent upon
"memory traces," which can be
played back as if by placing a stylus
into the groove of a phonograph
record. Rather, the process is one of
active, creative reconstruction which
begins at the moment of perception.
The reconstructive process is significantly affected by the form of the
questions asked and by what we
understand to be in our own interest
-- even though, on a conscious level,
we are responding as honestly as we
possibly can.
Those conclusions might seem to
suggest that the conscientious lawyer
should avoid giving a client or other
witness an understanding of what is
relevant and important and should
rely only upon narrative statements
unassisted by questions that seek to
elicit critical facts. However, anyone
who has conducted interviews will
immediately recognize that such a
procedure would be highly impractical. An untrained and perhaps inarticulate person cannot be expected
to relate all that is relevant without a
substantial amount of direction. That
is why one of the most important
functions of the lawyer is to provide
an awareness of what is legally relevant. Moreover, the same psychological authorities support the necessity of prompting to maximize recall.

What prompting can do is to trigger
recognition, which is a less complex
process than remembering. Bartlett
notes, for example, that in any experimental series, "only a relatively
small portion of the material that can
be recognized can, as a rule, be recalled." Another authority observes
similarly that narrative is "the most
accurate" but "the least complete" of
all forms of recall. That is, if we rely
only upon unprompted narrative,
many important facts will be omitted, facts which can be accurately
reported if memory is prompted by
recognition, such as through leading
questions.

Dilemma
Obviously, therefore, we are faced
with another dilemma. On the one
hand, we know that by telling the
client that a particular fact is important, and why it is important, we may
induce the client to "remember" the
fact even if it did not occur. On the
other hand, important facts can truly
be lost if we fail to provide the client
with every possible aid to memory.
Furthermore, since the client's
memory will inevitably be affected by
reconstruction consistent with selfinterest, a client who has a misunderstanding of his or her own legal interest could be psychologically inclined to remember in a way that is
not only inconsistent with the client's
case, but also inaccurate.
The Code of Professional Responsibility is ambiguous on the general
question of whether the attorney may
give advice that might induce perjury.
The applicable Disciplinary Rule
provides only that the lawyer should
not "participate in the creation" of
evidence when the lawyer knows or it
is obvious that the evidence is false.
The relevant Ethical Considerations
are of only limited assistance, in part
because they are intended to be only
"aspirational," and do not have the
binding force of disciplinary rules.
Ethical Consideration 7-5 provides
that a lawyer should not "knowingly
assist the client to engage in illegal
conduct," and that a lawyer should
never "encourage or aid" the client to
commit criminal acts or "counsel his
client on how to violate the law and
avoid punishment therefor." However, the footnote to the Code at that
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point suggests the extreme situation
in which the lawyer is representing "a
syndicate notoriously engaged in the
violation of the law for the purpose of
advising the members how to break
the law and at the same time escape
it." Ethical Consideration 7-6 says
that the lawyer may properly assist
the client in "developing and preserving evidence of existing motive,
intent, or desire," but adds that,
"obviously," he may not do
"anything" furthering the creation or
preservation of false evidence. That
last proscription is extremely broad.
The same Ethical Consideration also
notes, however, that in many cases a
lawyer may not be "certain" as to the
client's state of mind, and holds that
in those situations the lawyer "should
resolve reasonable doubts in favor of
the client."

Close Case
A situation that I consider to be
close to the ethical line is the
following. Assume that Jurisdictions
X and Y are adjacent to each other
and that many lawyers practice in
both jurisdictions. In Jurisdiction X,
there are a large number of
workmen's compensation cases in
which workers strain themselves
while lifting, and recover compensation. In Jurisdiction Y there is an
equivalent number of such cases, but
in all of them the workers who strain
themselves while lifting also slip or
trip on something in the process.
That coincidence is fortunate,
because in Jurisdiction X it is
sufficient for compensation simply
that the strain be work-related, while
in Jurisdiction Y the applicable law
requires that the injury be received in
the course of an "accident," such as a
slip or a trip. Obviously, the same
lawyers whose clients are not slipping or tripping in Jurisdiction X are
prompting their clients to recall a slip
or trip when the injury is received in
Jurisdiction Y.
In those cases, there are no issues of
intent or of judgment, but only of
objective fact. Nevertheless, even if
the client's initial narrative of the incident should omit any reference to
slipping or tripping, I believe that the
lawyer's obligation is to explain to the
client in Jurisdiction Y that one of the
legal requirements for recovery is an

accident, such as a trip or slip. As we
have seen in the earlier discussions of
experiments by behavioral psychologists, a factual detail of that sort
might very well be omitted in a narrative of the incident. Moreover, the
narrator's understanding (whether
accurate or inaccurate) of his or her
own self-interest will affect the
remembering-reconstruction of the
incident entirely apart from any
conscious dishonesty. Thus, the client
who incorrectly assumes that tripping or slipping might preclude recovery (perhaps because it might
imply carelessness) might unconsciously screen out that fact. Despite
the risk, therefore, that a dishonest
client might consciously invent a trip
or slip to meet the needs of the occasion, the attorney is obligated to
prod the client's remembering-reconstruction by explaining the relevance and importance of that factual
element.
To sum up, the attorney who is
interviewing and preparing a witness
must take into account the psychological realities of the situation. That
means, at least at the earlier stages of
eliciting the witness's story, that the
attorney should assume a skeptical
attitude, and that the attorney should
give the client legal advice that might
help in drawing out useful information that the client, consciously or
unconsciously, might be withholding.
At the same time, there will inevitably
come a point at which the lawyer
knows, to a moral certainty, that the
client's ability to reconstruct in good
faith has been fully tapped. It is at
that point, I believe, that the attorney who continues to seek the desired
testimony crosses the ethical line and
enters upon active participation in
the creation of perjury.

Notebook
(Continued.from page 38)
without some knowledge of the
various techniques which the profession has developed.
1. Impeaching with a written or
oral prior inconsistent statement is

one of the most effective techniques
available. First, you must commit the
witness thoroughly to the testimony to
be impeached. Then, if you have a
written statement made (or at least
signed) by the witness, have him read
it out loud to the jury. Finally, save
impeachment with prior inconsistent
statements for occasions where there
are real inconsistencies about important matters. For a more complete
discussion, see an earlier installment
of
this
column-Impeachment
Through Prior Inconsistent Statements, LITIGATION, Vol. 1 No. 2,
p. 41 (1975).

Set Questions
2. Set questions which are prepared in advance can often be effective. In nearly every trial there is some
situation that can be dramatized by
a series of questions which you know
can reasonably be answered only one
way. so that you almost do not care
how they are actually answered.
Often this sort of questioning will
take the form of a "flanking attack"
where apparently innocent truisms
and preliminary matters suddenly
add up to a major inconsistency.
3. Like set questions, there are
other techniques for, establishing
facts which turn out to be inconsistent with the testimony on direct. One
of these deals with attacking estimates of speed. It is helpful to remember that multiplying miles per
hour by one and one-half gives a very
close approximation of feet per second. Thus 60 mph x 1I/2 = 90 feet
per second (the exact figure is 88 feet
per second). Since most trial judges
will take judicial notice of this relationship, and since most witnesses'
estimates of time and distance vary
widely from their estimates of speed,
having the witness help you perform a
little calculation on a blackboard can
often convince the jury that none of
his estimates are very valuable.
4. Occasionally it becomes important to attack a time or distance estimate itself. While it is usually necessary to ask the judge's permission to
conduct in-court experiments, when
you are testing the ability of the witness to estimate time or distance, the
custom in most courts is to permit it
without obtaining any special leave.
But this sort of ploy is dangerous, and
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you must be as ready to let the jury
know that the estimate was accurate
as if it had been faulty, which leads
most careful counsel to ask for the estimates in an innocuous fashion
before proceeding to demonstrate
their inaccuracy.
5. Sometimes it is not possible to
question a witness in advance of trial.
Prosecutors in criminal cases operate
under this handicap. Frequently they
may have no idea what witnesses the
defense may call. In some cases, especially where self-defense is an issue,
the defendant can almost be counted
on to testify on his own behalf. The
usual defense practice is to call the
defendant as the last witness. Because the sequestration of witnesses
obviously cannot apply to the defendant, some prosecutors ask for leave
to withhold cross-examination of all
other witnesses, delaying their cross
until after the defendant has testified.
Their hope is to keep the defendant
from changing his story to fit the
details on which the other defense
witnesses have not yet committed
themselves. This device obviously
requires the cooperation of the trial
court and a somewhat quiescent
defense lawyer. Moreover, separating
cross-examination from direct examination, especially in a long trial,
gives the defendant an opportunity to
develop his case without serious interruption. On the other hand, there are
prosecutors who claim substantial
success with this technique.
Marginal Device6. A more marginal device is the "I
don't know" cross-examination. In a
well prepared civil case there are
usually complete depositions of all
witnesses. These often contain large
numbers of questions to which the
witness simply does not know the
answer. The "I don't know" technique is to scour the deposition of the
witness for every question which the
witness does not know the answer to,
and then ask that question on crossexamination. If he now knows the
answer, he can be impeached with the
deposition. Usually, however, he still
does not know and gives that answer
to a long string of questions. The net
effect is that the witness has very little
information of any importance to the
action. Of course, if the technique is
not carefully employed and is spotted

